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In Search of the Role of the Private Producer in
the Argentine Petroleum Industry
Nowhere can the vicissitudes of business life be experienced
more acutely than in the private sector of the petroleum industry of the Argentine Republic. The discovery of oil in Argentina
in 1907 precipitated an internal economic and political struggle
to develop a national oil policy that has continued to this day.'
On one side are the extreme economic nationalists who assert
that state ownership of all minerals and state monopoly of the
petroleum sector are fundamental to Argentina's industrial development and economic self-sufficiency. On the other side are
the aristocratic economic liberalists who thrive on an exportbased economy, support high importation levels, and encourage
local foreign investment. Playing the middle of the field are the
less radical economic nationalists who maintain that the state
should be involved in energy production, but that private investment and enterprise, under close scrutiny, should be allowed to
supplement government effort^.^ Historically, changes in governmental control among these forces have resulted in dramatic petroleum policy changes, usually in the form of executive decrees.
federal intervenors, or new legi~lation.~
For the present time, it is clear the Yacimientos Petroliferos
Fiscales (YPF), the official Argentinian state petroleum enter1. C SOLBERG,
OIL AND NATIONALISM
I N ARGENTINA-AHISTORY
9 (1979); South
America Cash Troubles Cloud Preurous Projections-Argentrna, WORLDOIL, Aug. 15,
1982, at 124 (major revisions in Argentina's petroleum legislation are probable) [hereinafter cited as WORLDOIL].
supra note 1, a t 1-7, 13-14, 34-37, 82-86, 116-29, 176-79; UNITED
2. See C SOLBERG,
RESOURCES,
ENERGY,
AND TRANSPORTATION,
STATEPETRONATIONS
CENTREFOR NATURAL
LEUM ENTERPR~SES
I N DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES
12 (1980) [hereinafter cited as CNRET].
3. See, e.g , Decree No. 744163, Buenos Aires, Argen., Nov. 15, 1963 (annulling oil
production controls), reprrnted in PETROLEUM
LEGISLATION
CO, SOUTHAMERICA-BASIC
CONTRACTS
(ORIGINAL
TEXTS)A-1 (Supp. IV 1964). The basic
OIL LAWSAND CONCESSION
hydrocarbons laws now in effect were instituted in 1967 under President Ongania. See
Memorandum from Minister Krieger Vassena and Secretary Gottelli to President Ongania (June 23, 1967) (submitting Hydrocarbons Law 17,319), repr~ntedIn PETROLEUM
CONTRACTS
{ORIGILEGISLATION
CO, SOUTHAMERICA-BASIC
OIL LAWSAND CONCESSION
NAL TEXTS)B-1, B-24 (Supp. XV 1967) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum of June 23,
OF AMERICAN
STATES,GENERAL
SECRETARIAT,
MININGAFD PETRO19671; ORGANIZATION
LEUM LEGISLATION
IN LATINAMERICA
AND THE CARIBBEAN
19 (1980). President Ongania
assumed his executive role in 1966.
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prise, is not, by itself, capable of satisfying Argentina's drive for
Although YPF has served as a forerunenergy self-suffi~iency.~
ner and model for state petroleum enterprises in Latin America,
labor problems, capital goods shortages, and financial struggles
in 1922,
.~
have plagued the company since its i n c e p t i ~ n Formed
YPF was not clothed with significant official public authority
until 195€L6The role of the company has constantly varied based
on the prevailing political climate. Further, YPF has never matured to the point of being able to fulfill the country's petroleum
needs without assistance from private investors and producers.'
Currently, YPF is heavily in debt and is not receiving adequate
prices for its production. In addition, government taxes are
stripping the company of much of its revenue^.^ Thus, based on
YPFYshistory and present status, Argentina will likely have a
strong appetite for private petroleum investment and private
hydrocarbon-seeking activities for the foreseeable f u t ~ r e . ~
This comment explores the role of the private producer in
the Argentine oil and gas industry. This comment does not focus
on the political and economic turmoil in Argentina, but rather
centers on the key legal arrangements under which a private entity can enter the country and engage in exploration and production activities. In addition, the philosophy and principles underlying the country's petroleum legislation are examined, with
special emphasis on the implications for a private petroleum
producer considering entering the country to conduct business
operations. By examining these two areas of consideration, a private producer can better understand how to conduct hydrocarbon-seeking and -producing activities in Argentina, and will
have a framework for anticipating and protecting himself against
Argentina's volatile political and economic trends.
4. C. SOLBERG,
supra note 1, at 173-75 (charts showing historical production
records); WORLD
OIL,supra note 1.
5. C. SOLBERC,
supra note 1, at 40-45, 66-69, 98-99, 158-59, 164-65, 172; CNRET,
supra note 2, at 161; Parker, Argentina Eyes More Private Oil Work, OIL& GASJ., Dec.
6, 1982, at 121; WORLD
OIL,supra note 1.
6. [I9581 Law No. 14,773 (Argen.) (nationalization of fields of hydrocarbons), reLEGISLATION
Co., SOUTHAMERICA-BASIC
OILLAWSAND CONCESprinted in PETROLEUM
SION CONTRACTS
(ORIGINAL
TEXTS)F-1 (SUPP.XIV 1967).
supra note 1, at 173-75 (production charts); WORLD
OIL,supra note
7. C. SOLBERC,
1.
8. WORLDOIL,supra note 1; see also C. SOLBERG,
supra note 1, at 172-73.
9. See CNRET, supra note 2, at 45; Parker, supra note 5; WORLD
OIL,supra note 1.
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Argentina's basic petroleum law is Hydrocarbons Law
17,319 of 1967, as amended by Law 21,778 of 1978." Under the
provisions of these laws, private companies can participate in exploration and development of hydrocarbons in three distinct
ways:
(1) Through "work or service contracts;""
(2) Through a concession-type approach;'* or

(3) Through "risk contracts" with state enterprises.I3

This comment focuses on the viability of the second and third
types of arrangements. The first type of arrangement has been
employed in various forms over the years and can be highly lucrative for private companies.14 However, service contract transactions did not prove successful, from Argentina's point of view,
in promoting sufficient exploration and development activities.'"
Argentina's response to this shortcoming of service contracts has
10. H. GREEN,
ENERGY
LAWGUIDE-WORLDPETROLEUM
POLICY
REPORT3 13, a t C-87
(1981).
11. [I9671 Hydrocarbons Law No. 17,319, arts. 11, 95 (Argen.), reprinted in PETROLEUM LEGISLATION
CO., SOUTHAMERICA-BASIC
OIL LAWSAND CONCESSION
CONTRACTS
(ORIGINAL
TEXTS)A-4, A-31 (Supp. XIV 1967) [hereinafter cited as Law 17,3191.
12. Memorandum of June 23, 1967, supra note 3, a t 5, 9-10.
13. Decree 2658, Buenos Aires, Argen., Nov. 6, 1978 (Regulations to Risk Contracts,
LEGISLATION
CO., SOUTH
Law 21,778, cl. 1, Apr. 14, 1978), reprinted in PETROLEUM
OIL LAWSAND CONCESSION
AMERICA-BASIC
CONTRACTS
(ORIGINAL
TEXTS)1 (Supp. LIII
1978) [hereinafter cited as Regulations]; Memorandum to the President of Argentina
from Ministers of Justice, Economy & Interior (explaining Law No. 21,778 of Apr. 14,
1978), reprinted in PETROLEUM
LEGISLATION
CO, SOUTHAMERICA-BASICOIL LAWAND
C o ~ c E s s l oCONTRACTS
~
(ORIGINAL
TEXTS)12 (Supp. LIII 1978) [hereinafter cited as
Memorandum of Apr. 14, 19781. For examples of actual risk contracts, see Contract Resulting from the Bid (Licitacion No. 14-035/79) for the Development and Exploitation of
Hydrocarbons of the "Comodoro Rivadavia Coastal Belt" Area-San Jorge Gulf BaLEGISLATION
CO. SOUTHAMERICA-BASIC
sin-Argentine Sea, reprinted in PETROLEUM
CONTRACTS
(ORIGINAL
TEXTS)1 (Supp. LXV 1981) [hereinafOIL LAWSAND CONCESSION
ter cited as Contract for the "Comodoro Rivadavia Coastal Belt" Area]; Contract Resulting from Bid No. 14-029179 for the Exploration, Development and Exploitation of Hydrocarbons (Law No. 21,778) in "Llancanelo" Area-Neuquen Basin-Province of
LEGISLATION
CO., SOUTHAMERICA-BASIC
OIL LAWS
Mendoza, reprinted in PETROLEUM
AND CONCESSION
CONTRACTS
(ORIGINAL
TEXTS)1 (Supp. LXVII 1981) [hereinafter cited
as Contract for the "Llancanelo" Area]; Contract Resulting from the Bid (Licitacion No.
14-023/79) for the Exploration, Development and Exploitation of Hydrocarbons (Law
No. 21,778) of the "Malargue Sur" Area-Meuquina Basin-Mendoza Province, reLEGISLATION
CO., SOUTHAMERICA-BASIC
OIL LAWSAND CONCESprinted in PETROLEUM
SION CONTRACTS
(ORIGINAL
TEXTS)1 (Supp. LXIII 1980) [hereinafter cited as Contract
for the "Malargue Sur" Area].
supra note 1, a t 168.
14. CNRET, supra note 2, a t 31; see also C. SOLBERG,
15. Memarandum of June 23, 1967, supra note 3, a t B-5.
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been the enactment of its current laws. While these laws still
allow for service contract transactions,le they emphasize involvement, through risk contracts or concession arrangements, in a
three-tier structure consisting of surface prospecting, exploration, and exploitation activities. Each of these phases furnishes
the private operator with unique rights and opportunities.

A. Surface Prospecting
Any civilly competent party, including universities and
other research organizations, may conduct surface prospecting
for the existence of hydrocarbons without being encumbered by
the rigidity and burdens of the country's general exploration
systems." By obtaining consent from surface owners and a permit from the government prescribing the scope and conditions of
the reconnaissance, such a party may engage in "any . . .
method appropriate for petroleum exploration."18 The prospecting can occur both onshore and offshore but it cannot infringe
upon areas where exploration and exploitation permits have
been awarded, most areas reserved for state enterprises, or areas
that have been expressly banned from such activity by the Na+
tional Executive Power.'" Although this last restriction gives the
state great discretion, the state does have important incentives
for agreeing to such studies. First, the exercise of these rights
does not generate any legal claim in the prospector to conduct
~~
the prospector must demore extensive e x p l ~ r a t i o n .Second,
liver "the primary data" of his surface inspection to the state.21
Although the state cannot reveal the data for two years without
the gatherer's permission, this restriction on divulgence is
greatly weakened by an exception that provides for the release
of the data in the event that a permit or concession is awarded
in the area
Consequently, if the state (which has the right to process
16. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-4, A-31 (arts. 11,95); Memorandum of June 23,
1967, supra note 3, at B-9, B-23.
17. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-4, A-5 (arts. 14-15); Memorandum of June 23,
1967, supra note 3, at B-12.
18. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-4, A-5 (arts. 14-15). Some methods will necessi-

tate obtaining approval from the state. The state can also inspect and control all of the
works involved. Id.
19. Id. at A-4, A-5 (art. 14).
20. Id.
21. Id. at A-5 (art. 15).
22. Id.
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the information, by itself or through the use of third persons,
and to use the information for its own purposes) concludes that
the property has hydrocarbon potential, it can put out a tender
for bids on the property and then release the prospecting information to the party whose bid is selected.23 Also, the law does
not indicate whether the prospecting information is available to
state petroleum companies during this two-year period of confid e n t i a l i t ~ The
. ~ ~ result is that the state gains a lot and gives up
very little. On the other hand, the prospective producer could
gain some very valuable information, but it is of no significant
exploratory value to him unless he is prepared to compete for
additional rights through a public bid.

B. Exploration
Under Laws 17,319 and 21,778, the most aggressive and potentially profitable petroleum activities are classified into two
types: exploration and e x p l o i t a t i ~ n Any
. ~ ~ given project may involve one or both of these types of activities, but it is not likely
to intentionally include only an exploration phase. After all, the
exploration phase is simply used to discover commercial deposits
of hydrocarbons that justify commencing the exploitation stage.
Under Law 17,319, and probably under Law 21,778, exploration
rights are awarded only for "possible" zones.26 These are zones
in which the presence of hydrocarbons in commercial quantities
has yet to be proven.27Properties containing proven reserves of
commercially exploitable hydrocarbons are classified as
proven," and only exploitation rights are awarded in such are a ~ Consequently,
. ~ ~
a program on "possible" lands involves
66

23. Id. a t A-14 (art. 45). Awards of permits and concessions under Law 17,319 are
based on the bid which is "most conducive to the interest of the Nation." Id. at A-15
(art. 48).
24. The National Executive Power can enlarge the areas reserved to the state companies. Id. at A-4 (art. 11).
25. [I9781 Hydrocarbons Law No. 21,778, art. 25 (Argen.), reprinted in PETROLEUM
LEGISLATION
CO., SOUTHAMERICA-BASIC
OIL LAWSAND CONCESSION
CONTRACTS
(ORIGINAL TEXTS)1, 11 (Supp. LIII 1978) [hereinafter cited as Law 21,7781; Law 17,319, supra
note 11, at A-5, A-9 (arts. 16, 27).
26. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-8 (art. 24). Law 21,778 operations are governed
17,319 in any matter that was not modified or specifically provided for under
by ~ a w
Law 21,778. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 11 (art. 26). For a definition of "possible
zones," see Law 17,319, supra note 11, a t A-4 (art. 10).
27. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-4 (art. 10).
28. See id. (arts. 24, 29); Contract for the "Comodoro Rivadavia Coastal Belt" Area,
supra note 13, a t 2 (art. 1).
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more risk and entails both an exploration phase and, if hydrocarbons are discovered in commercial quantities, an exploitation
phase. A plan to develop a proven area presents less risk and
only involves an exploitation phase.29
The purpose of the exploration phase is to both require and
authorize the private operator to search for commercial deposits
within the bid area. This is a weeding out period for the state
because a t the end of the exploration period, any property that
has not been explored or proven worthy of exploitation is relinquished to the state.30 Activities during this period are conducted pursuant to work and investment commitments made in
the bid.31
Under Law 17,319 an exploration permit confers exclusive
rights to search for hydrocarbons within the permit area during
the period s p e ~ i f i e dAn
. ~ ~exploration permit also authorizes the
holder to undertake all works "conducive to the discovery of hydrocarbons," including surface prospection, exploratory drilling,
and construction of transportation, communication, and other
necessary f a ~ i l i t i e s .Inherent
~~
in each exploration permit is an
exclusive concession of the exploitation of any and all hydrocarbon deposits found within the permit area.34 Within indicated
time periods and under threat of specified penalties, a permit
holder that discovers hydrocarbons must announce (1) the discovery of the hydrocarbons, (2) if the discovered deposit is commercially exploitable, and (3) his intentions concerning ob29. See, e.g., Law 17,319, supra note 11, a t A-9 (art. 29, concessions on proven
lands); Contract for the "Comodoro Rivadavia Coastal Belt" Area, supra note 13, a t 2
(art. 1) (purpose of the contract is development and exploitation with no exploration
phase included).
30. Law 17,319, supra note 11, a t A-8, A-9 (art. 26); Regulations, supra note 13, a t
14-15 (cls. 10.1, 10.4). As an additional incentive to encourage prompt exploration, the
exploration period is divided into smaller periods of time and, at the end of each small
period, a minimum of 50% of all lands not converted to exploitation parcels or previously relinquished are returned to the state. Law 17,319, supra note 11, a t A-8, A-9 (art.
6); Regulations, supra note 13, a t 2, 14 (cls. 2.9, 10.1).
31. Law 21,778, supra note 25, a t 3-5 (art. 9); Law 17,319, supra note 11, a t A-6, A7, A-15 (arts. 20, 47, 48).
32. Law 17,319, supra note 11, a t A-5 (art. 16). The basic unit of an exploration
permit is 100 square kilometers and a single permit cannot exceed an aggregate of 100
units for an onshore permit or 150 units for an offshore permit. Id. a t A-8 (arts. 24, 25).
33. Law 17,319, supra note 11, a t A-6 (art. 19); Memorandum of June 23, 1967,
supra note 3, a t B-13.
34. Law 17,319, supra note 11, a t A-6 (art. 17); Memorandum of June 23, 1967,
supra note 3, a t B-13.
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taining a concession and e x p l ~ i t a t i o n .Thus,
~ ~ the conclusion
that commercially exploitable hydrocarbons have been discovered moves the Law 17,319 operator into the exploitation phase
for that particular deposit. The awarding of an exploitation concession, however, does not terminate the permit holder's exploration rights for remaining lands not converted to a concession.
As these residual lands are explored, they can enter the concession phase or be relinquished to the state. At the end of the exploration phase, all lands within the permit area that have not
been converted into an exploitation concession must be given
up=
.'
The exploration procedure under Law 21,778 closely resembles that of Law 17,319. The regulations to Law 21,778 provide
that contracted works shall be carried out in two stages, one for
exploration and the other for development and p r o d ~ c t i o n . ~ ~
The 1980 Unionoil International Exploration Company, Ltd./Inalruco S.A. Petrolera Risk Contract explains that during the exploration phase, the "Contractor must determine and notify . . .
Y.P.F. whether . . . the . . . field . . . is considered commer~ ~ regulations also define (for investment
cially e ~ p l o i t a b l e . "The
and work commitment purposes) an exploration well as one
drilled where no productive well has been previously drilled, or
where a stratigraphic trap is sought, or, in some cases, where the
purpose of drilling a well or wells is to delineate a field. In addition to drilling wells, a Law 21,778 contractor is obligated to
carry out a program of "exploration works" that will generate
locations for drilling exploratory wells.39 A Law 21,778 contractor who makes a discovery must present YPF with a plan for
determining if the "deposit is commercial or not or if it can beThis
come one when exploited along with other disco~eries."~~
moves the contractor into the exploitation phase for that
deposit.
Unlike Law 17,319, Law 21,778 does not set out stringent
penalties for failure to announce a discovery or for concealment
35. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-7, A-8 (arts. 21-22); Memorandum of June 23,
1967, supra note 3, at B-14.
36. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-7 to A-9 (arts. 22-23,26); Memorandum of June
23, 1967, supra note 3, at B-14.
37. Regulations, supra note 13, at 4 (cl. 3).
38. Contract for the "Llancanelo" Area, supra note 13.
39. Regulations, supra note 13, at 3-4 (cls. 2.13, 11.4).
40. Id. at 5-6 (cl. 3.2.1); see also Contract for the "Malargue Sur" Area, supra note
13, at 6-7 (art. 3.2.1) (maximum term for such a program is twenty-four months).
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of a commercially exploitable field. I t is possible that the provisions of Law 17,319 which pr-ovide for penalties also apply to
Law 21,778. However, another explanation for the lack of specified penalties in Law 21,778 may be the fact that a Law 21,778
producer must sell all of his production, and provide extensive
information, to state oil companies. Consequently, the state is
In contrast,
more likely to know about a Law 21,778 disc~very.~'
a Law 17,319 operator has free marketing opportunities and thus
more opportunities and incentives to conceal his disc~veries.'~
The Law 21,778 exploration period terminates, like the Law
17,319 exploration period, with the relinquishment of lands not
committed to exploitation lots and the cessation of the right to
drill additional exploration wells.43

C . Exploitation
The exploitation phase is designed to allow the private operator to reap the benefits of his exploration discoveries. Pursuant to work plans submitted to the state, the operator tries to
realize the full potential of the deposits discovered, hopefully
within the time period allotted. A Law 17,319 exploitation concession confers an exclusive right to exploit any hydrocarbon
fields existing within the area specified by the concession during
the established time period." Law 17,319 obligates the concessionaire to seek for and produce the maximum production that
is consistent with economic and conservation concepts. Also, the
operator must strive to develop the entire concession acreagesd6
To assist the Law 17,319 producer in doing this, the statute
gives the concessionaire the right to obtain a nonexclusive transportation concession, and various other ancillary privileges such
as the right to build treating and refining plants, communication
systems, and building^.'^
Under Law 21,778, the basic unit for production and devel41. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 1, 5 (art. 4, 9(h)); Regulations, supra note 13, at
20-22 (cls. 1.0, 15.0); see also Contract for the "Malargue Sur" Area, supra note 13, at
15-16, 51-54 (art. 9, Annex IV).
42. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-2, A-3 (art. 6); Memorandum of June 23, 1967,
supra note 3, at B-5, B-10, B-11.
43. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 4 (art. 9(d)); Regulations, supra note 13, at 14-15
(CIS.10.1, 10.2, 10.4).
44. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-9, A-11 (arts. 27, 33-34).
45. Id. at A-10 (art. 31).
46. Id. at A-9, A-10 (arts. 28, 30); Memorandum of June 23, 1967, supra note 3, at
B-15.
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opment is the "exploitation lot." These lots are defined as "the
fraction within the area [originally] being bidded on in which
the commercially exploitable hydrocarbons are l~calized."~'The
Law 21,778 contractor agrees to promptly delineate the boundaries of the field'18 and to employ the most "reasonable and efficient techniques" in an effort to "obtain [the] maximum production of hydrocarbons compatible with the appropriate
exploitation of same."4n
1. Direct exploitation activities

Under both Law 17,319 and Law 21,778, there are two paths
that lead to exploitation projects. The first is by way of an
agreement to enter directly into exploitation activities without a
preliminary exploration period.50 In this situation, a private
party is concerned with (1) the land available to him, (2) the
time limitations on his rights, (3) the work and investment commitments he is obligated to undertake, and (4) the fiscal regime
he is subject to during the life of his concession.
The state determines both the locations and the size of the
properties that are available under Law 17,319 and Law 21,778.51
Although only Law 17,319 specifies maximum acreages for an exploitation concession, it does not appear that the size of an exploitation parcel is a negotiable matter, especially when the original agreement is to perform exploitation operations only. A
private entity interested in a particular area may submit a proposal concerning that area. If the state decides that such a recommendation should, in the best interests of the nation, be followed, then a tender for bids will be put out on that area. The
author of the proposal will be given preference only if his bid
offer is equal to the best of all the offers made.s2
In addition to land constraints, the rights of private petroleum producers are of limited duration under the Argentine
47. Regulations, supra note 13, at 2, 5 (cls. 2.8, 3.2).
48. Id. at 19 (cl. 13.10) (six month period allotted).
49. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 2 (art. 6(a)). Law 21,778 does not mention ancillary privileges so Law 17,319 rights should apply. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 11 (art.
26) (matters not modified or expressly provided for in Law 21,778 are covered by Law
17,319).
50. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-9 (art. 29); Memorandum of June 23, 1967,
supra note 3, at A-14.
51. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 3-5 (art. 9); Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-3 (art.
9).
52. Law 17,319, supra note 11, a t A-14, A-15 (art. 46).
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laws.63 When these lands revert to the state, operating equipment, fixed installations, and, in some cases, mobile accouterments are also transferred free of encumbrance to the state.64 A
private operator must assure himself that, within the time frame
allotted, the economics will be favorable to him based on how
many wells will be drilled, expected production rates and productive lives of wells, and projected percentages of wells that
will be dry.
The operator will also be required to make work and investment commitments for achieving his exploitation goals. Law
17,319 provides that a concessionaire shall be "bound to make
such investments as may be necessary, within reasonable periods
of time, for the execution of the works required for the development of the entire acreage comprised in the area of his concession . . . ."nn Law 21,778 requires a contractor to submit his
timetable and investment plans to YPF.6BExcept where force
majeure, acts of God, or certain technical difficulties intervene,
failure to meet Law 17,319 or Law 21,778 commitments can result in penalization of the private entity including damages or
cancellation of the agreementsn7
Law 17,319 and Law 21,778 each have their own fiscal regime (i.e., taxes, rents, royalties) governing operations conducted
under their provisions. The Law 17,319 fiscal regime tries to aid
a private entity in preparing for a permit or concession and in
realizing those plans. Law 17,319 does this by identifying in advance, by type and amount, all of the financial obligations that a
permit holder or concessionaire is liable for during the term of
the agreement." These obligations include payment of:
(1) All provincial and municipal taxes extant on the date of
the award. Governing bodies cannot levy new taxes or increase preexisting taxes except when the changed rates represent a defrayment of costs of services rendered or
53. Memorandum of Apr. 14, 1978, supra note 13, at 14; Memorandum of June 23,
1967, supra note 3, a t B-10.
54. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 4 (art. 9(e)); Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-11,
A-12, A-29 (arts. 37,85); Regulations, supra note 13, at 17 (cl. 12); Memorandum of June
23, 1967, supra note 3, at B-22; see also Contract for the "Comodoro Rivadavia Coastal
Belt" Area, supra note 13, a t 8 (art. 5).
55. Law 17,319, supra note 11, a t A-10 (art. 31).
56. Regulations, supra note 13, a t 21 (cl. 15.3).
57. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 4-5 (art. 9(g)); Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-27
to A-30 (arts. 80, 87-88).
58. Memorandum of June 23, 1967, supra note 3, a t B-17.
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when the tax change constitutes a contribution toward
improvements or a general increase of taxesbg
All national tributes assessed on imported items, exchange surcharges, and capital gains taxes. Aside from
these, and the other taxes set forth below, the operator is
exempt from all other national taxation (as to activities
related t o his permit or concession) except for adjustments which defray costs of services provided or contributed toward improvements or where the entity has assumed responsibility for a third party's tax liability.60
A special income tax of 55% of the operator's net profits.
The statute prescribes a formula for computing net
profit^.^'

A progressive annual surface tax during the exploration
period.62
An annual surface tax during the exploitation period of
20,000 pesos per square kilometer or fraction thereof.6s
A 12% royalty on liquid hydrocarbons and natural gas
that the National Executive Power can reduce by 5% if
production conditions merit such a decrea~e.~'
Any special benefits (e-g., bonuses, deferred or cumulative
payments) that the private party committed to in the bidding proces~.'~
Additionally, any hydrocarbons lost through the fault or
negligence of the operator shall be included as production
in making these c a l c ~ l a t i o n s . ~ ~

This scheme is a benevolent effort by Argentina to be fair to
private entities. The exceptions provided for in (1)and (2), however, seem to open wide gaps t h a t minimize t h e restrictions laid
on new or increased taxes; and, unfortunately, the guaranty of a
stable tax regime does not encompass a guaranty of a stable
economy to operate in.
Law 21,778 approaches the tax treatment of its contractors
from a different angle than does Law 17,319. Rather than prescribing an intentionally stagnant fiscal regime, Law 21,778 per59. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-17 (art. 56(a)).
60. Id. at A-17, A-18 (art. 56(b)). Shareholders and direct pecuniary beneficiaries
also come under this tax umbrella. Id. at A-20, A-21 (art. 56(d)).
61. Id. at A-18 (art. 56(c)).
62. Id. at A-21 (art. 57(a)).
63. Id. (art. 58).
64. Id. at A-21, A-22 (arts. 59, 62).
65. Id. at A-15, A-23 (arts. 47, 64).
66. Id. at A-23 (art. 65).

414

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[I984

mits the use of price escalator clauses in risk contracts to adjust
prices paid to operators for their production in response to "the
precise incidence" of tax fluctuation^.'^ However, similar to the
provisions of Law 17,319, "service rates and betterment taxes"
are excluded.6s Law 21,778 contractors must abide by Argen~ ~ two optina's "tax regulations of general a p p l i ~ a b i l i t y "with
tions concerning a modified depreciation rule and an option to
update tax losses based on the general level of the wholesalers
price index.?O The nation's stamp tax assessment is based on the
contractor's investment commitment in the risk contract and is
payable over a term that commences on the date the contractor
is notified of the decree approving the risk contract.?'
An annual surface fee (per square kilometer or fraction
thereof) is set in the call for bids. The amount of the fee relates
to the characteristics of the particular bid area.72A special 100%
deduction is granted for certain investments that underwrite the
stock of Argentine companies engaged in risk c o n t r a ~ t i n g . ~ ~
Goods, special tools, parts, components, and some spares and accessories are exempted from import duties upon entry into the
country and from export duties upon leaving Argentina when
the contract expires.74 Investments made by contractors are not
subject to certain foreign investment regulations and YPF is liable for the 12% royalty on production that is payable to the
state.76 Obviously, a more thorough knowledge of the country's
general tax structure is needed before potential risk contractors
should attempt interpreting these provisions.
67. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 7 (art. 15); Regulations, supra note 13, a t 24-25
(cl. 17.2).
68. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 7 (art. 15); Regulations, supra note 13, at 24-25
(cl. 17.2).
69. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 6-7, 10 (arts. 14, 20).
70. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 6-7 (arts. 14(a), 14(b)); Regulations, supra note 13,
a t 24 (cls. 17.1, 17.l(a), 17.l(b)). For an example of tax regimes in actual risk contracts,
see Contract for the "Comodoro Rivadavia Coastal Belt" Area, supra note 13, at 27 (art.
13).
71. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 7 (art. 16).
72. Id. (art. 17); Regulations, supra note 13, at 25 (cl. 17.4).
73. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 8-9 (art. 18); Memorandum of Apr. 14,1978, supra
note 13, at 14-15.
74. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 9-10 (art. 19) (compensation for services is expected from this.exemption; there are limitations on the sale and movement of these
imported goods); Memorandum of Apr. 14, 1978, supra note 13, at 15.
75. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 10 (art. 23); Regulations, supra note 13, a t 25 (cl.
17.3); Memorandum of Apr. 14, 1978, supra note 13, at 15-16.
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2. Exploitation following exploration activities
The second way a private producer can enter into an exploitation phase is through exploratory discoveries that precipitate conversions of exploration lands into exploitation lands.76
For a Law 17,319 exploration permit holder, this is triggered
when "the permit holder through the application of approved
technical criteria shall have determined the existence of commercially exploitable hydrocarbon^."^^ When this vague standard has been met, the permit holder must declare his plans
. ~ ~ a concession will
concerning an exploitation c o n c e ~ s i o nThen,
be awarded and the new concessionaire must submit his work
and investment commitments for the exploitation phase for approval by the state.78 A Law 17,319 concessionaire has a duty to
delimit the productive area (which the concession boundaries
will conform to) as promptly as possible.80 This is likely to be a
natural goal of the concessionaire anyway owing to the impermanent nature of his rights.
The Law 21,778 approach to exploitation ensuing from exploration shows more oilfield sense than the Law 17,319 provisions do for such a conversion by laying out a more extensive
and practical procedure for the changeover. When a Law 21,778
contractor discovers a deposit of hydrocarbons, he begins the
transition into exploitation by announcing to YPF his plans for
determining if the accumulation has, by itself or in combination
with other discoveries, commercial p ~ t e n t i a l The
. ~ ~ pursuance of
such a program will then result in one of three conclusions concerning the investigated hydrocarbon traps: it is commercial, it
is not commercial, or its commerciality is still unclear.
If a deposit is labelled noncommercial, the contractor must
immediately release all areas coinciding with the trap that was
tested.82 However, if the operator is hesitant to label a property
76. Law 17,319, supra note 11, a t A-6, A-9 (arts. 17, 29).
77. Id. a t A-7, A-8 (art. 22).
78. Id. Indeed, an exploration permit holder who makes a discovery cannot proceed
with field exploitation until he has committed to opt for an exploitation concession. Id.
a t A-7 (art. 21).
79. Id. a t A-10 (art. 32).
80. Id. a t A-10, A-11 (art. 33).
81. Regulations, supra note 13, a t 5-6 (cl. 3.2.1); see also Contract for the "Llancanelo" Area, supra note 13, at 7-8 (art. 3.2.1) (contractor has up to twenty-four months
to carry out its program for determining commerciality).
82. Regulations, supra note 13, a t 6 (cl. 3.2.3); see also Contract for the "Malargue
Sur" Area, supra note 13, a t 7 (art. 3.2.3).
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noncommercial and, at the same time, is not convinced of the
prospect's commerciality (e.g., it could be commercial if exploited with other discoveries or if prices were to increase
slightly), the contractor is permitted to postpone the declaration
of his conclusion. The maximum permissible length of this postponement will be set out in a "document of particular conditions," but in no event shall it extend beyond the end of the
exploitation stage time period.83
If a deposit is determined to be commercial, then the contractor must submit all of his geologic and engineering informa~~
tion to YPF along with a plan for full e ~ p l o i t a t i o n .Law
21,778's enactment was specifically aimed a t encouraging the
discovery and development of Argentina's offshore reserve^.^^
Accordingly, Law 21,778 has a unique provision. When an offshore gas field is discovered, the exploitation period may be suspended for up to ten years to await the development of a market
and transportation facilities for the gas.86
An operator who commences exploitation as a result of conversion from exploration must still concern himself with the applicable fiscal regime, time periods limiting his rights, and work
and investment commitments as described above. The quantity
of land available to him will be based largely on the initiative he
takes and his success in finding exploitable fields. Both Law
17,319 and Law 21,778, therefore, provide a legal mechanism for
converting new discoveries into production and development
programs, but the Law 21,778 system is clearer and better calculated to conform to oilfield practices.

This section analyzes the underlying principles of Argentina's petroleum laws and the impact those principles have on
private producers. Two of these principles, state dominance of
the petroleum industry and Argentina's need for private activity
in the petroleum industry, are in constant tension. The dynamics of the conflict between these principles help to explain
changes in the country's petroleum policy. Another one of the
83. Regulations, supra note 13, at 6 (cl. 3.2.4).
84. Regulations, supra note 13, at 6, 21 (cls. 3.2.2, 15.3); see also Contract for the
"Malargue Sur" Area, supra note 13, at 7, 16 (arts. 3.2.2, 9.3).
85. Memorandum of Apr. 14, 1978, supra note 13, at 13, 16.
86. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 4 (art. 9(e)).
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fundamental principles, private responsibility for the mining
risks of exploration and exploitation, does not present a new
concept for private producing entities. The final principle deals
with ownership of the hydrocarbons that are produced and the
consequences of ownership or nonownership to a private entity.
After studying these essential principles, a private producer will
recognize and understand the general concerns he should have
about the Argentine petroleum industry.

A. State Dominance us. Dependence on Private Investment
and Activity
"[I]ndespensable [sic] . . . control of the state over all asthe exploration, exploitation, transportation,
pects involved inwB7
and marketing of hydrocarbons characterizes Argentina's petro~~
this philosophy of state domileum l e g i s l a t i ~ n .Undergirding
nance is Law 17,319's pronouncements that the nation's hydrocarbons are "inalienable and imprescriptible assets" of the
state.8s The National Executive Power controls the legal mechanisms of the petroleum industry by making major policy decisions under Law 17,319 and by approving all risk contracts
under Law 21,778." The Secretary of Energy assists the National Executive Power by applying and executing these laws.81
"State companies" are the "essential agents" for the state in its
petroleum activities and these companies play a dominant role
in the accomplishment of the national objective^.^^ Strategic
proven and prospective hydrocarbon lands are reserved for the
sole dominion of the state companies to aid them in fulfilling
their assigned function^.^^
The National Executive Power sets its policies in accordance with the express national objective of meeting the coun87. Memorandum of June 23, 1967, supra note 3, at B-1.
88. Memorandum of Apr. 14, 1978, supra note 13, at 13; Memorandum of June 23,
1967, supra note 3, at B-4.
89. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-1 (art. 1). This approach solves a multiplicity of
jurisdictions problem that has plagued the development of a national policy, but it also
raises constitutional issues concerning ownership and procedural jurisdiction over hydrocarbon reserves. These issues have been hotly debated for many years. See id. at A-4
(art. 12) (provinces to participate equally with the national government in provincial
production).
90. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 5-6 (arts. 12,13); Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A1, A-32 (arts. 3, 98).
91. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-26, A-32 (arts. 75, 97).
92. Id. at A-4, A-30 (arts. 11, 91).
93. Id.
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try's petroleum needs from indigenous produ~tion.'~
Law 17,319
was directed toward accomplishing this goal through the granting of exploitation concessions. When it became evident that
Law 17,319 alone would not meet this
Law 21,778 was
enacted to stimulate further activity by allowing the state companies to enter into risk contracts with private en ti tie^."^ These
nonpublic entities were to assist state companies in developing
those lands reserved to them, especially offshore prospect^.'^
Another basic theme, partially expressed and partially implied, of Argentina's petroleum laws is the country's great need
for the economic and technical assistance that private investment and other private involvement provide. In the petroleum
sector itself, private entities can supply the tremendous financial
resources required for petroleum exploration, particularly in offshore projects." Private companies also have technical abilities
that the state need^.'^ Both Law 17,319 and Law 21,778'0•‹ require private operators that want to participate in Argentina's
petroleum industry to possess the technical competence and financial resources necessary to perform the works that will be required of them. By surpassing the "dubious efficiency (resulting
from) . . . subordinating the extraction of hydrocarbons to the
technical and economic resources of the state,"'O1 a petroleum
industry buoyed up by private money and ingenuity gives desperately needed support to the country's quest for "economic
expansion on reasonable technical and economic bases."'02 Aside
from boosting the petroleum industry, private participation is
expected to stimulate local industry and increase employment.'03
Despite "the acknowledged competence of Argentine technical
94. Id. at A-1 (art. 2); Memorandum of June 23, 1967, supra note 3, at B-8 to B-10.
95. CNRET, supra note 2, at 45.
96. Regulations, supra note 13, at 1 (cl. 1); Memorandum of Apr. 14, 1978, supra
note 13, at 12.
97. Memorandum of Apr. 14, 1978, supra note 13, at 12-13, 16; WORLD
OIL,supra
note 1, at 125-32.
98. Memorandum of Apr. 14, 1978, supra note 13, at 13; Memorandum of June 23,
1967, supra note 3, at B-4; CNRET, supra note 2, at 45.
99. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 1 (art. 2).
100. Id.; Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-1, A-2 (art. 5 ) ; Regulations, supra note 13,
at 1, 8-9 (cls. 1, 5.2); Memorandum of June 23, 1967, supra note 3, at B-13.
101. Memorandum of June 23, 1967, supra note 3, at B-2.
102. Id. at B-1.
103. Memorandum of Apr. 14, 1978, supra note 13, at 16; Memorandum of June 23,
1967, supra note 3, at B-4.
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personnel and labourer^,"'^^ a private producer is required
under both Law 17,319 and Law 21,778 to employ a high percentage of Argentinians.lo5
Even though the Argentine petroleum legislation is founded
on the principle of state control, this principle is in constant tension with and must be balanced against Argentina's genuine
need for private involvement in accomplishing its petroleum and
economic goals. Unfortunately, Argentina's administration of its
hydrocarbon laws sometimes does not reflect the country's substantial need for private involvement and, when this happens,
both Argentina and the private operators suffer.lo6
The exact impact this struggle between state dominance of
natural resource development and reliance upon private investment and technology will have on the private operator is difficult to anticipate. Some general observations would be more appropriate. A private producer planning to operate in Argentina
for the entire duration of a risk contract or concession agreement should expect to experience all ranges of the spectrum of
government dominance.'07 An initial indicator of the tenor of the
Argentine government at a particular time is the political ideology of the governing authorities. Economic nationalist leaders
favor energy self-sufficiency spawned by active government involvement. Government involvement can range from tariff protection and an infrastructure base designed to stimulate private
Argentine exploration and production efforts, to complete state
dominance of the petroleum industry. Economic liberalist leaders, on the other hand, welcome foreign investment and involvement in petroleum-seeking and -producing activities. Economic
liberalism in Argentina is export based and is founded on cordial
foreign relations and interchange.
These philosophical labels are of limited value, however, because Argentine politicians do not always remain loyal, a t least
in practice, to their ideological classifications. Still, even though
theoretical bases are of limited value in predicting how Argen104. Memorandum of June 23, 1967, supra note 3, at B-21.
105. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-25 (art. 4); Regulations, supra note 13, at 19-20
(cl. 13.12).
106. Parker, supra note 5; WORLDOIL,supra note 1.
107. This is exemplified by the varying treatment afforded to Standard Oil Comsupra note 1. See
pany of New Jersey and its subsidiaries. See generally C. SOLBERG,
J. BEHRMAN,
P. CHURCH.
G. EDWARDS,
H. GOMEZ,
W. HARalso R. MIKESELL,
W. BARTSCH,
RIS, M. MAMALAKIS,
D. WELLS,M. WIONCZEK
& J. ZINSER,
FOREIGN
INVESTMENT
IN THE
PETROLEUM
AND MINERAL
INDUSTRIES
157-88 (1971).
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tine rulers will direct the petroleum industry, it is important to
monitor the country's political development as effectively as
possible because political developments may prove to be the single most critical factor in the progress or lack of progress of Argentina's petroleum i n d ~ s t r y . ' ~ ~
In many ways, the Argentine conflict between state control
of and private contribution to the oil and gas industry typifies
the petroleum technology transfer battle that developing countries have waged with private oil cornpanie~.'~~
Hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation activities are markedly enhanced by
technological abilities and advancements. Historically, private
multinational corporations have provided the technology required for worldwide petroleum operations. Naturally, sovereign
countries want to control the use and depletion of their indigenous natural resources. Hence, as in Argentina, an ensuing
struggle sets the governments of developing countries (that .want
to regulate the development of their own energy resources)
against the private oil companies (that are seeking to fulfill their
own ends) possessing the technology needed for resource utilization. Initially, this confrontation produced concession arrangements giving wide latitude to the oil companies and providing
limited financial benefits but no technological benefits to the
host countries."O Such concession arrangements were present
under early Argentine oil laws.''' Gradually, developing countries began using petroleum contracts and other means to develop petroleum technology among their own industries and labor market^."^
Provisions under Law 17,319 and Law 21,778 that require
the hiring and training of Argentine nationals, the delivery of
oilfield information to the state, and the reversion of production
equipment and facilities to the state are examples of Argentine
efforts to acquire te~hnology."~Additionally, Argentina has a
108. At least one business advisor feels that energy progress is closely related t o
politics. See Wanniski, Energy In Abundance, LANDMAN,
Jan. 1983, at 7-12.
109. See generally Zakariya, Transfer of Technology Under Petroleum Deuelopment Contracts, 16 J. WORLDTRADEL. 207 (1982).
110. See CNRET,supra note 2, at 109-10, 152; Zakariya, supra note 109, at 211.
111. See Memorandum of June 23, 1967, supra note 3, at B-1, B-2; C. SOLBERC,
supra note 1, at 14-15.
112. See Zakariya, supra note 109, at 210-22.
113. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 4, 5 (arts. 9(e), 9(h)); Law 17,319, supra note 11,
at A-11, A-12, A-24, A-25 (arts. 15, 37, 70, 71); see also Zakariya, supra note 109, at 21115.
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petroleum technology training institute and belongs to ARPEL,
a Latin American association of state petroleum enterprises.l14 A
complete transfer of technology
lies in the ability of the developing country to purchase or hire
directly the most advanced technical means of petroleum exploration and development, if and when it so wishes, at a reasonable price. It also lies above all, in developing the mental
skills of its citizens to utilize these technical means effectively,
alone if they choose to do so."'
However, a full technology transfer is closely tied to economic
and industrial development in the developing country.l16 Argentina's shortcomings in these areas make it probable that a complete technological transfer is a distant dream for Argentina, but
it is likely that private operators in the country will be faced
with demands from the government to assist this transfer of
technology.
Finally, in understanding the state dominance versus private participation conflict, the concepts of political ideology and
technology transfer must be set afloat on the underlying sea of
social, economic, and political problems that plague Argentina.
As a developing country, Argentina seems like a child that is dissatisfied with what it has and yet does not know what it wants.
For the oil industry, the result of Argentina's uneasiness is a
constantly changing oil p01icy."~ The country would like to pay
fair oil prices to producers, yet economic problems make this
difficult. Socially and politically, some forces in Argentina would
like to achieve energy self-sufficiency, but the country lacks the
financial and technological ability to do so."8 The consequences
to the private operator are uncertainty and instability in the petroleum industry.

B. Risk and Ownership
Under both Law 17,319 and Law 21,778, the private opera114. See CNRET, supra note 2, at 82-91; see also Zakariya, supra note 109, at 208,
220.
115. Zakariya, supra note 109, at 219.
116. Id. at 222.
supra note 1, at 156-76. Law 21,778 was enacted in 1978 and,
117. See C. SOLBERG,
by 1982, the country was considering new major changes in its oil legislation. See generOIL,supra note 1.
ally WORLD
118. See Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-1 (art. 3); Memorandum of June 23, 1967,
supra note 3, at A-8; C. SOLBERG,
supra note 1, at 172-77; CNRET, supra note 2, at 45.
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tor assumes all "hazards defined as mining r i ~ k . " " ~Producers
operating under Law 17,319 own the hydrocarbons they produce,
including the right to transport, refine, and market their production.120 This system is designed to provide "substantial incentives" by opening up the vistas of vertical integration (e.g., marketing, exportation) to nonpublic entities.lZ1 The exercise of
nonproduction rights, however, is subject to regulation by the
National Executive Power. Some initial regulations are set forth
in Law 17,319. For example, liquid hydrocarbons can be sold
only in domestic markets until the objective of petroleum selfsufficiency is met.lZ2In addition, all natural gas produced in Argentina is subject to a first purchase option granted to the
"State-owned enterprise responsible for the public service of gas
distrib~tion."'~~
In contrast to Law 17,319, companies contracting under
Law 21,778 receive no legal rights under applicable mining laws,
"nor will they have ownership of the hydrocarbons so obtained."lZ4 However, if domestic needs are satisfied from indigenous production and an adequate supply of reserves has been
accumulated, the contractor may receive payment in kind.lZ6AS
a limitation on this practice, however, YPF can restrict payment
in kind to crudes so that even when national requirements are
met, natural and liquified gas may not be available in kind.lZ6
In the simplest sense, the procedures under Law 17,319 and
Law 21,778 are very similar and, from a producer's viewpoint,
the ownership distinctions between the laws are not crucial.
Both laws prescribe a system mandating delivery of a specified
119. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 1 (art. 2); Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-1, A-2
(art. 5).
120. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-2, A-3 (art. 6); Memorandum of June 23, 1967,
supra note 3, at B-5, B-10, B-11.
121. Memorandum of June 23, 1967, supra note 3, at B-5, B-15.
122. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at B-2, B-3 (art. 6). This limitation is subject to
exceptions justified on technical grounds. Id.; Memorandum of June 23, 1967, supra note
3, at B-10. The Executive Power may prescribe rules which assure an equitable and rational participation by all companies in the domestic market. Law 17,319, supra note 11,
at B-2, B-3 (art. 6).
123. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-3, B-2 (art. 6); Memorandum of June 23, 1967,
supra note 3, at B-11 (operators can consume hydrocarbons as needed for their
operations).
124. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 1 (art. 3); Memorandum of Apr. 14, 1978, supra
note 13, at 13.
125. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 1 (art. 4); Regulations, supra note 13, at 1, 23
(cls. 1, 16.2.3); Memorandum of Apr. 14, 1978, supra note 13, at 13, 14.
126. Regulations, supra note 13, at 23 (cl. 16.2.3).
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amount of production into internal markets, after which the producer may dispose of any excess output as he chooses.127Within
these basic procedural frameworks, however, differences between
the Law 21,778 operator and the Law 17,319 concessionaire do
emerge. These disparities, which are largely rooted in ownership
rights, can be recognized and managed by the producer by studying the price the producer can receive for his production and
the likelihood that the producer will have an available market
for all of this production. Additionally, the producer must consider the quantity of his production over which he will have exportation rights. These factors, and not ownership differences,
become critical in the producer's analysis of his opportunities for
profitable operations in Argentina.
In evaluating the prices available for his production, a producer interested in exploring in Argentina should ascertain the
relative prices obtainable under Law 17,319 and Law 21,778
transactions. Also, since the producer is committed to serving
local markets until domestic needs are met, the producer must
compare prices available in Argentina to world oil prices.128For
liquid hydrocarbons, Law 17,319 concessionaires have more price
latitude than Law 21,778 contractors because concessionaires
have transportation and marketing rights to their p r o d u c t i ~ n . ' ~ ~
Law 21,778 operators are obligated, until payment in kind is allowed, to sell their output to "the state company,"130 whereas
the only significant restriction put on crude prices by Law
17,319 is that the National Executive Power might set prices.131
However, the statute tries to temper this possibility by assuring
that "reasonable profits" will be attainable and that even if
prices are set by the National Executive Power, they will be
equal to those established for the state oil company and will not
be lower than those prevailing for imported crudes of similar
127. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at B-2, B-3 (arc. 6) (operator must obtain a commercially reasonable price for exported crude).
128. See Argentine Contract Talks Hit Snags, OIL & GASJ., Jan. 10, 1983, at 44.
Sagging prices have proven to be a major flaw in the Argentine oil industry and, combined with soaring inflation and political instability, have resulted in a downward production trend in the country. Enright, World Oil Flow, Refining Capacity Down
Sharply; Reserves Increase, OIL & GASJ., Dec. 27, 1982, at 75,77,79; Parker, supra note
OIL, supra note 1.
5; WORLD
129. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-2, A-3 (art. 6); Memorandum o f June 23, 1967,
supra note 3, a t B-5.
130. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 1 (art. 4); Regulations, supra note 13, at 1 (cl. 1).
131. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-2, A-3 (art. 6).
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quality and under similar condition^.'^^ This latter provision
should serve to keep Law 17,319 prices a t the world market
level.
Law 21,778 crude producers are subject to a more nebulous
price structure, with the payment in cash being based on "the
unit of measurement corresponding to the type of hydrocarbon
obtained and delivered . . .
Since these price standards are
set by the state and a risk contractor can sell crude only to the
state until payment in kind is made, the Law 21,778 risk contractor has no control over the price he receives for his domestically marketed crude. He will be paid according to the state's
established price structure.
For gas, Law 17,319 provides that gas prices shall be set by
agreement and that the prices "shall assure the operator an eqThis proviuitable return on the corresponding inve~trnent."'~~
sion, combined with the state company's preemptive right to
purchase a concessionaire's gas output, puts the Law 17,319 gasproducing concessionaire in much the same position as the Law
21,778 gas-producing contractor that must sell under contract to
the state company based on the same price framework that Law
21,778 crude contractors are subject to.13' The similarity is further enhanced by Law 21,778's authorization allowing YPF to
prevent payment in kind for natural and liquid gas (i.e., YPF
can limit payment in kind to crude p e t r ~ l e u m ) , 'which,
~~
in effect, gives the state a first option to purchase on all of a Law
21,778 risk contractor's gas production.
Before a petroleum producer commences an exploration
program, the producer wants to be assured that he will be able
132. Id. a t A-2, A-31 (art. 6); Memorandum of June 23, 1967, supra note 3, a t B-11.
It appears that this last guarantee has not been abided by. A. IGLESIA,
POLITICA
PETROLERA ARGENTINE
263 (1980). Perhaps this failure to meet world prices can be explained by the sudden upturn in the world price in recent years and by the Law 17,319
exception which provides that "[s]hould the prices of imported crudes be substantially
increased due to exceptional circumstances, such prices shall not be taken into consideration for establishing the domestic marketing prices . . . ." Law 17,319, supra note 11,
a t A-2 (art. 6).
133. Law 21,778, supra note 25, a t 1 (art. 4); see also Regulations, supra note 13, a t
1 (cl. 1). For an example of crude price formulas in risk contracts, see Contract for the
"Comodoro Rivadavia Coastal Belt" Area, supra note 13, at 22-23 (art. 11.1).
134. Law 17,319, supra note 11, a t A-3 (art. 6).
135. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 1 (art. 4); Regulations, supra note 13, a t 1 (cl. 1);
Memorandum of Apr. 14, 1978, supra note 13, a t 13. For an example of risk contract gas
formulas, see Contract for the "Comodoro Rivadavia Coastal Belt" Area, supra note 13,
a t 23-24 (arts. 11.2, 11.3).
136. Regulations, supra note 13, a t 23 (cl. 16.2.3).
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to market his product commercially. This should not present a
major problem for a Law 17,319 producer. The free market access allowed to such a producer provides him with the opportunity to solve any major marketing obstacles during both
nonexportation and exportation periods. Even though a Law
17,319 gas producer must first offer his gas to the state company,
such option to purchase must be exercised by the state within
"reasonable time limits" and the producer can, with appropriate
approval and subject to prescribed regulations, decide on the
disposition of any gas not purchased by the state.13'
The Law 21,778 producer, on the other hand, has only one
buyer prior to payment in kind-the state.'38 Such a contractor
could find himself in a difficult position if the state company is
unwilling (e.g., because the quality of the crude is not suited to
the state company's refining facilities) or unable (e.g., lack of
storage capacity) to take the contractor's product while, a t the
same time, domestic production has not satisfied domestic needs
so that the payment in kind alternative is also not available to
the contractor. The Law 21,778 operator must contractually anticipate these eventualities and obtain either guarantees of receipt of his production in reasonable geographic locations with
penalties against the state for failure to comply, or the right to
dispose freely of any excess production not taken by the state
company. Additionally, provisions should be made stipulating
who bears the costs when additional storage or transportation
facilities are required to sustain receipt of the private operator's
production by the state company. Various provisions along this
line have been used by risk contractors including:
(1) A guarantee of reception of a specified volume of crude oil
by YPF with options for the contractor to dispose of any

excess.
(2) Specification of the reception standards that the hydro-

carbons must meet (e.g., water content, salinity levels).
Agreements
on when the contractor will not be obliged to
(3)
make certain production related investments.
(4) Provisions for reinjection or commercial disposal (with a
137. Law 17,319, supra note 11, A-2, A-3 (art. 6); Memorandum of June 23, 1967,
supra note 3, at B-11, B-12.
138. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 1 (art. 4); Regulations, supra note 13, at 1 (cl. 1).
For an example of actual production, delivery, and transportation clauses in risk contracts, see Contract for the "Llancanelo"Area, supra note 13, at 21-30 (art. 10, Annex V,
Annex VI).
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partial payment to YPF) of gas that YPF cannot receive
or for which transportation facilities are not available.
Allowance of construction and operation by the private
contractor of equipment for obtaining liquified gas.
Assessment of penalties against YPF for failure to comply
with its reception requirements for any causes other than
force majeure or fortuitous case.
Provision for who bears the cost of storage and treatment
facilities.
Provision, as part of two thermal stimulation pilot
projects, that the contractor and YPF shall agree on the
conditions under which the contractor may dispose of
crude oil not disposed of by YPF.
Provisions concerning transportation to YPF's point of
reception.lsg

Obviously, a private operator can make only limited demands when dealing with a foreign sovereign in a competitive
bidding situation. Nevertheless, the contracting company must
protect itself by assuring reception of its production on the most
favorable terms possible.
A final important concern of a private operator working in
Argentina is the quantity of his production that will be available
for exportation. In a country such as Argentina that has severe
economic problems and chronic political instability, an operator
wants t o have free rein, including the right t o export as much of
his production as is possible. The ability to export provides an
opportunity to circumvent unfavorable market conditions within
the country. Nevertheless, Argentine production must satisfy
Argentine petroleum needs before any private operator may
truly claim freedom to dispose of his production, especially the
~~
the restricfreedom to export that p r o d u c t i ~ n . 'Additionally,
tions on export rights to natural gas are more stringent than
those for crude petroleum.141 A Law 17,319 producer of 'liquid
hydrocarbons has to be authorized by the National Executive
139. For examples, see Contract for the "Comodoro Rivadavia Coastal Belt" Area,
supra note 13, at 14-15, 18-19, 20 (arts. 10.1, 10.2.2, 10.3); Contract for the "Llancanelo"
Area, supra note 13, at 23-26 (arts. 10.1, 10.2.2, 10.3); Contract for the "Malargue Sur"
Area, supra note 13, at 17-19, 21 (arts. 10.1, 10.2.2, 10.3).
140. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 1 (art. 4); Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-2, A-3
(art. 6); Regulations, supra note 13, at 1 (cl. 1); Memorandum of Apr. 14, 1978, supra
note 13, at 1-14; Memorandum of June 23, 1967, supra note 3, at B-10, B-11.
141. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 1 (art. 4); Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-2, A-3
(art. 6); Regulations, supra note 13, at 1, 23 (cls. 1, 16.2.3).
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Power to export crude supplies that are "in excess of the normal
needs of the internal market."lq2
Aside from meeting domestic production goals, the only
statutory restrictions placed on the right to export are that the
prices received for the exported production be commercially reasonable in 'light of the international market and that the operator submit to any promulgated rules designed to accomplish equitable participation in the internal market by all producers
within the
Similar in nature, but slightly more restrictive, is the Law 21,778 proviso that a contracting company
may receive payment in kind when domestic production meets
domestic demand and an "adequate margin of reserves [as decreed by the National Executive Power] has been establi~hed.""~
One further drawback that a contractor might experience is
that if crude risk contract prices in Argentina are low and payment in kind is made based on the cash price, the operator may
be disappointed at the quantity of crude received as payment in
kind. However, both the 1980 Unionoil International Explora'~~
tion Company, Ltd./Inalruco S.A. Petrolera Risk C o n t r a ~ t and
the 1979 Occidental De Argentina Inc./Bridas/Union Texas1
Compania Quimica Risk Contractlq6provide that once the contractor has invoiced YPF for crude for which payment is due in
kind, the contractor may "dispose of said Crude Oil immediately."lq7 So the Law 21,778 crude oil threshold point for export
rights is higher than the Law 17,319 threshold level, but once a
Law 21,778 contractor that has contracted to receive payment in
kind reaches the payment in kind stage for crude, he has unrestricted rights of disposition.
For natural gas exportation rights, a private operator must
overcome more legal obstacles than for crude exportation rights.
142. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-2, A-3 (art. 6); Memorandum of June 23, 1967,
supra note 3, at B-10, B-11.
143. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-2, A-3 (art. 6); Memorandum of June 23, 1967,
supra note 3, at B-10, B-11.
144. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 1 (art. 4); see also Regulations, supra note 13, at
1 (cl. 1). Payment in kind is available only if "clauses contemplating such possibility and
the basis for pricing the hydrocarbons delivered in payment have bcen incorporated to
the corresponding contract." Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 1 (art. 4).
145. Contract for the "Llancanelo" Area, supra note 13.
146. Contract for the "Malargue Sur" Area, supra note 13.
147. Contract for the "Llancanelo" Area, supra note 13, at 37 (art. 11.4); Contract
for the "Malargue Sur" Area, supra note 13, at 28 (art. 11.5).
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Under Law 17,319, a concessionaire may, upon obtaining appropriate consent, decide upon the disposal and utilization of any
natural gas not purchased by the state company. There is no
limit, though, on how much of his production the state company
can purchase,148 making uncertain the availability of export
rights. Even more restrictive is the Law 21,778 reservation by
the state of the right to refuse any payment in kind on any "natural and liquid gas produced."149 Thus, a Law 21,778 gas producer may not receive payment in kind even after domestic demand is met and an adequate reserve is established.
Some risk contracts provide that when gathering and transportation facilities are lacking, a contractor may, in some instances, commercially market (and export) the gas produced and
pay YPF 25% of the price the contractor would have received if
the gas had been delivered to the state.150 Underlying these nuances for Law 21,778 natural gas disposition is the same basic
Law 21,778 standard-satisfaction of domestic demand and an
adequate supply of reserves-that applies to crudes.161 In summary, the essence of the exportation right is that a producer's
right to export revolves around the whims of the state and the
achievement of national production goals.

The private sector of the Argentine petroleum industry does
present exploration and production opportunities for entities
that possess sufficient technical and financial competence. This
industry, however, is highly regulated by the state and should
not be entered without a thorough investigation of the prevailing
political and economic climates within the country. In addition,
whenever legally possible the private company must insist on intelligent contractual safeguards anticipated to protect its interests. In the private company's favor, and balanced against the
state's desire to control its resources, is the fact that Argentina
148. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-2, A-3 (art. 6); Memorandum of June 23, 1967,
supra note 3, at B-11, B-12.
149. Regulations, supra note 13, at 1, 23 (cls. 1, 16.2.3); see also Contract for the
"Llancanelo" Area, supra note 13, at 36-37 (art. 11.3); Contract for the "Malargue Sur"
Area, supra note 13, at 27-28 (art. 11.4).
150. Contract for the "Comodoro Rivadavia Coastal Belt" Area, supra note 13, at 10
(arts. 10.2.1, 10.2.3).
151. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 1 (art. 4); Regulations, supra note 13, at 1 (cl. 1);
Memorandum of Apr. 14, 1978, supra note 13, at 13-14.
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cannot rely on its state-owned companies to satisfy the country's
petroleum production goals. As a consequence, Argentina has a
definite need for private investment and participation in this vital industry.
The private operator looking at potential involvement in
Argentina's oil and gas industry has three avenues to consider:
service contracts, risk contracts, or concession arrangements.
This comment analyzed the latter two alternatives from an exploration and production perspective. Both the risk contract and
the concession agreement provide exploitation rights and, as required, exploration rights tailored to meet a specific prospect's
requirements. Both, however, come burdened with work and investment commitments and fiscal regimes that require an operator to accurately and continuously plan and evaluate his activities. In all, the demands of keeping up with all of these
commitments, combined with the economic and political instability of Argentina, furnish the private operator with an interesting and challenging legal and business venture.

Stephen L. Snow

